AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE
BRITISH
SECOND CORPS
On January 10, 1918, the British requested that American
battalions be brought over to France for service in British divisions. England agreed not
only to furnish supplies for these troops, but also to undertake to provide sufficient
commercial shipping to assure the transport of the American battalions to France, without
interference with our own program. The condition was that these American battalions serve
in British divisions for a minimum period of four or five months. It was agreed, however,
that the period of training with the British cover a period of about 10 weeks. For
purposes of supervising the demonstration and training of the divisions involved, the
Second Corps staff was created on March 19, 1918, without, at first, a commanding general.1, 2
Several months passed before the arrival of the
divisions, during which time the corps headquarters staff made all necessary preliminary
arrangements for their reception, assignment to training areas, their training, billeting,
etc. In the late spring of 1918, the designated divisions, less Artillery, began to arrive
and continued to do so throughout the summer, the Infantry of the following divisions
constituting, at one time or another, the Second Corps: 77th, 35th, 28th, 4th, 82d, 33d,
30th, 78th, 27th, and 80th.8, 1
On arrival in France, the Artillery and part of the
personnel of the sanitary trains of these divisions were diverted to various points with
the American Expeditionary Forces other than in the British area. Each of the divisions in
the Second Corps was assigned to a section back of the British front, and immediately
began a course of training, preparatory to taking its place in line.4
About the middle of August, the 33d, 78th, and 80th
Divisions, which had belonged to the Second Corps, and were in training in various
localities on the British front, were withdrawn, leaving with the corps the 27th and 30th
Divisions, which were attached to the British Second Army in Flanders. These two
divisions, having completed their phase "B" training, as set forth in the
program of training for American divisions serving with the British, were put in the line
as divisions; the 30th on August 19, with the British Second Corps, and the 27th, on
August 23, with the British Nineteenth Corps. The 30th Division was on the right of the
Second Corps and the 27th on the left of the Nineteenth Corps, and the two divisions were
side by side in what were known as the Canal and Dickebush sectors.4
Arrangements were made between our Second Corps
headquarters and the headquarters of the British Second Army, whereby a new corps sector
was to be formed out of the two above-named sectors, to be taken over by the Second Corps.
The necessary divisional Artillery and corps troops were turned over by the British, and
all the orders were issued for the passing of the command at 6 p. m. on August 30, 1918.
However, at 5 p. m. on that date orders were received from British general headquarters
withdrawing the Second Corps from the British Second Army, and placing it in British
general headquarters reserve, in the vicinity of Doullens. Consequently, although the two
divisions functioned as such in the line for about two weeks and took part in the
operation in which the enemy lost Mount Kemmel and the high ground in its vicinity, the
corps did not actually function in active operations in the British Second Army.4
From September 3 to September 22 the Second Corps formed
part of the British general headquarters reserve. It occupied training areas in the
vicinity of Doullens, with corps headquarters at Beauval. While here information was
received from British general headquarters that the corps would be used later in
operations then in contemplation, and the prescribed program of training was entered upon
with this end in view.4
On September 20 the Second Corps was released from
general headquarters reserve and was transferred to the British Fourth Army, with a view
to its employment in contemplated operations against the Hindenburg line east of Peronne.
The movement took place during the period of September 22-24.4
On the night of September 23-24 the 30th Division
relieved the Australian 1st Division, in the line west of Bellicourt, taking over what was
known as the Nauroy sector, a front of approximately 3.3 km. (2.1 miles). In the sector
taken over by the 30th Division, the British had, during recent operations, captured most
of the advanced trench system which ran about 910 meters (1,000 yards) west of the main
Hindenburg line. The front line of the division, accordingly, occupied approximately what
had been known as the Hindenburg outpost line. The division was disposed with the 59th
Brigade holding the sector and the 60th Brigade in divisional reserve.4
On the night of September 24-25 the 27th Division
relieved the British 18th and 74th Divisions in the line, taking over what was known as
the Gouy sector, a front of approximately 4 km. (2.5 miles), connecting with the 30th
Division on its right. On this front the British divisions had never succeeded in gaining
the advanced defenses of the Hindenburg system. These defenses were particularly strong
and comprised three very troublesome strong points, known as the Knoll, Quennemont farm,
and Guillemont farm. The front line of the 27th Division occupied approximately the old
British front-line trenches, which was very close to the Hindenburg outpost line. The line
was taken over by the 53d Brigade; the 54th Brigade was held in divisional reserve.4
Opposite the sector occupied by the corps, the country
was gently rolling and open, with a fairly well-defined ridge running from near Vendhuile
at the northern limit of the sector, to Bellicourt, near the southern limit. This ridge
roughly paralleled our front line at a distance of 1.76 km. (1.1 miles). Through it, longitudinally, the Cambrai—St. Quentin
canal passed, by means of a deep tunnel, generally known as the Bellicourt tunnel. The
main Hindenburg line, consisting of a complicated system of trenches, heavily wired, ran
along this ridge, 182 to 364 meters (200 to 400 yards) west of the tunnel, which passed
under the eastern slope of the ridge. The tunnel added tremendously to the natural
strength of the position.4
To break this strong portion of the German line, it was
necessary to utilize every available means of inflicting loss on the enemy and of breaking
up his defensive arrangements. In order that the attack might be carried on by fresh
troops, after the line had once been penetrated, the Australian corps was affiliated with
the Second Corps, for the attack. The Second Corps, having no American artillery assigned
to it, the entire operation was supported by British and Australian artillery.4
The plan of the corps attack was, briefly, to carry the
bridges of the canal, if possible, and to gain objectives on the east thereof. As soon as
the 30th and 27th Divisions had reached their objectives, the Australian 5th Division, on
the right, and the Australian 3d Division on the left, were to pass through the 30th and
27th Divisions, respectively, and to continue the advance to a line which included the
towns of Beaurevoir and Wiancourt.4
The main attack was to be preceded by a preliminary
operation for the purpose of advancing the line of departure to the outpost line of the
Hindenburg defenses. The 30th Division, upon its entry into line, had partially occupied
the outpost position, but the 27th Division was still to the west of it.5
The objective was the rearmost trench of the Hindenburg
outpost line, to gain which would require an advance of about 1,100 yards from the line
already occupied by the 27th Division.5
The advance started at 5.30 a. m. September 27. There
was hard fighting, which lasted all day. The Infantry seemed to have advanced in places to
the objective, but the strong points at the Knoll and Guillemont and Quennemont farms were
not taken, and German counterattacks forced the withdrawal of those fragments that had
reached the objective, except on the extreme right, where groups held on and were
connected with the left flank of the 30th Division. The fighting died down during the
afternoon and evening, and during the night the 27th Division front line was established
at approximately the position it occupied prior to September 27.5
In preparation for the main operation, each division, on
the night of September 27-28, relieved the brigade in line by the brigade which had been
in reserve.4 The main attack
started at 5.50 a. m. September 29. The morning was very foggy. This fog, mixed with the
smoke of the barrage, made it extremely difficult to see more than a few feet in any
direction. Almost from the start, the Infantry and tanks experienced great difficulty in
maintaining direction and contact. In the right division sector of the Second Corps, the
advance was made against heavy resistance, without serious mishap. On the afternoon of
September 29, the 30th Division, being approximately on its objective, the Australian 5th
Division passed through it, as had been planned. At this time, the 117th Infantry, on the right, was
approximately on its objective, facing southeast, and in touch with the British 46th
Division, to the right. The 120th Infantry was in Nauroy. In the left division sector,
grave difficulties were encountered from the start. Apparently expecting the attack in
this sector, the enemy pushed out strong parties through the underground passages,
communication trenches, and ravines, and succeeded in getting considerable forces on our
side of the barrage line. The advance was opposed by heavy machine-gun fire along the
whole front. The right of the line in this sector succeeded in getting forward to the edge
of Bony, in the main Hindenburg line. Along other parts of the line elements pressed
forward, in spite of the heavy opposition, and detached groups reached their objectives at
various points throughout its extent. Quennemont farm and various other strong points held
out. Elements which had passed through the main point of resistance thus found themselves
between two fires. The Australian 3d Division, which had been designated to pass through
the 27th Division, assisted and supported that division through the latter part of the
advance.4
From October 1 to 5 the Australian corps improved the
position obtained as the result of the attack on the Hindenburg line, and advanced to a
line running from Montbrehain northwest to Beaurevoir. On the night of October 5-6 the
Second Corps relieved the Australian corps, which was then withdrawn to a back area, and
the command of the corps sector passed to the commanding general, American Second Corps,
at 9 a. m., October 6.4
On October 8, at 5.15 a. m., an attack was launched
along the entire army front, with the object, as far as concerned the Second Corps, of
capturing Brancourt and Premont and advancing the line a distance of about 5.5 km. (3.44
miles).4 The 30th Division
attacked; the 27th Division was corps reserve.
The fighting was severe, but the normal objective was
gained by 10 a. m. and the contingent objective by evening. The progress of the British
divisions on the flanks was slower than that of the 30th, whose task thus was rendered
more difficult by flank fire.5
The success of the day’s work may be ascribed in
part to the fact that the Germans had already decided upon a general retreat on this front
and were fighting merely a rear-guard action.5
On October 9, at 5.20 a. m., the attack was resumed, and
in the afternoon the towns of Busigny and Becquigny were captured.4
On October 10, at 5.30 a. m., the attack began again, to
secure the Selle River and the high ground beyond. The country at this point was thickly
scattered with villages, farms, and woods, and the enemy took full advantage by its very
effective use of machine guns. The 119th Infantry, however, captured Escaufort and St.
Souplet, and with the British, St. Benin, in the face of heavy fire.4 The 120th Infantry took Vaux-Andigny, but the
British Ninth Corps on its right got only as far as the west edge of the Bois de
Riquerval. The 120th, being then exposed to fire from the south and southeast, was
compelled to refuse its right along the railway south of Vaux, and was unable to
reach its objective, the village of Molain and the Selle River.5
On the following day the attack proceeded. Stubborn
resistance was still encountered, as during the day before, but on the right, the town of
La Haie Menneresse was taken by assault, and the line advanced there about 910 meters
(1,000 yards). The left sector remained stationary. On the night of October 11-12 the 30th
Division, which had been continuously attacking since October 7, and had advanced over
13.6 km. (8.5 miles) on a 6.3-km. (3.9-mile) front, was relieved by the 27th Division. The
30th Division was withdrawn to the vicinity of Premont and Butry Wood, where it remained
in support for five days.4
On the night of October 15-16 the 30th Division took
over the right half of the sector from the 27th Division,4 on a line that was practically the same as that turned over by it five
days earlier. These five days had been utilized by the corps in consolidating the strength
of captured territory, over which it had advanced, and in preparing for the next attack,
which was scheduled by the British Fourth Army to open on October 17.4
On October 17 the British Fourth Army attacked along its
whole front. The Second Corps attacked with the 27th and 30th Divisions in line, the
attack beginning at 5.20 a. m. Vigorous resistance, assisted by the natural defenses of
the terrain, was met from the start. Part of the line of departure of the 27th Division
ran through the partly destroyed village of St. Souplet, where even unimpeded progress
would have been slow. The attacking troops, therefore, fell behind their barrage and
suffered for lack of its assistance in clearing the machine-gun nest on the ridge just
beyond. A thick fog made observation very poor during the morning. When the advance
regiments of the 27th Division reached the line just west of Le Cateau—Arbre Guernon
road, they were too far in front of both flank divisions to permit continuing on until
these came up. Consequently the division halted on this line. After capturing the villages
of St. Martin Riviere and Molain, the progress of the 30th Division was very slow. The
task of the 30th Division was made particularly difficult due to the necessity of forming
a defensive flank to maintain touch with the British division on its right, which was
experiencing the same difficulty still farther to its right. As a result of the day’s
fighting, the line was advanced 3.6 km. (2.2 miles).4
On the 18th a late start was made because of the
necessity of maintaining contact with the divisions on the right. The terrain was
especially difficult, containing the strong positions of Ribeauville, Ecaillon, and
Mazinghien. The first two of these towns were captured before nightfall; and after an
advance of about 1.3 km. (1,500 yards), halted in a position encircling the town of
Mazinghien. On the morning of October 19 the 30th Division made a determined attack at
5.30 a. m., and took the town of Mazinghien by assault, pressing vigorously on to La Haie
Tonnoile farm, a distance of nearly 2.7 km. (2.1 miles). The objective for this
day’s attack was the high ground overlooking Sambre a l’Oise canal, and by night
the west slope of this ridge had been reached all along the divisional front.4
Meanwhile the 27th Division had pushed out strong
patrols, behind which the line advanced slowly to the next ridge. Here the strong point of Jonquieres was captured at 10 a. m., giving the 27th
Division complete command of the high ground, while patrols advanced across the St.
Maurice River. The ridge beyond, behind which lay Le Catillon, was strongly fortified by
machine guns. This was the situation by nightfall, October 19. The commanding ground
overlooking Catillon and the Sambre canal had been reached and a pause on this part of the
front was ordered, pending movements on other parts. Both the 27th and 30th Divisions had
been strongly attacking, with but little rest, since September 29. Their losses had been
heavy, and no replacements had been received. The army commander therefore gave
instructions for the withdrawal of the corps for a period of rest, refitting, and
assimilating of replacements which were then en route. This period was to last from two to
three weeks. The 30th Division was relieved on the night of October 19-20, and the 27th
Division on the night of October 20-21, the corps sector being taken over by the British
Ninth and Thirteenth Corps.4
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Upon the arrival of each division surgeon in the corps
area, the corps surgeon immediately met him and gave him the training schedule which
previously had been prepared. Arrangements had already been made with the director
general, medical services, British Expeditionary Forces in France, for the assignment of
an officer of the Royal Army Medical Corps to the staff of each American division, as
liaison officer, and when the divisions arrived, these officers reported and subsequently
assisted in many ways.5
The corps surgeon had the following officers on his
staff: One consultant in surgery, one consultant in medicine, and an assistant in charge
of clerical work and the office force.5
Complete records were kept of the medical, dental, and
veterinary officers, with a station list. Frequent reports of venereal diseases and sick
and wounded reports were required, and copies of correspondence originating in and passing
through the corps surgeon’s office were filed. In addition, reports and returns were
required by the chief surgeon, American Expeditionary Forces, as well as certain reports
and returns to the director general, medical services, British Expeditionary Forces in
England. The latter were simple in nature and few in number.5
After the arrival in France of the divisions
constituting the Second Corps, the first and most important duty of the corps surgeon was
completion of the training of divisional medical officers and of the enlisted men of the
sanitary units and detachments. The program of training for American divisions serving
with the British, issued by General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, was
strictly adhered to. Prior to the arrival of the 77th Division, the first division to
report to the Second corps, preliminary arrangements had been made, after a conference
with the director general, medical services, British Expeditionary Forces. These included
the detail of British officers to the divisions which have been mentioned, and provision
was made that two British field ambulances be assigned to each division, especially for
training purposes, but also to be used in caring for and transporting sick and wounded during the training period. These replaced the
division stationary trains which were diverted elsewhere.5
During the summer of 1918 the Medical Department of the
Second Corps entered energetically into work intended to render its personnel thoroughly
familiar with conditions on the British section of the Western Front. This, the final
stage of their training, consisted of daily drills; demonstrations of sanitary
arrangements in the field and in the trenches; frequent conferences of division medical
officers; "talks" by experienced American and British medical officers
concerning the various problems confronting sanitary troops on the Western Front. The
lectures and practical demonstrations covered especially prevailing diseases and their
prevention, including trench fever and trench foot, the application of splints, treatment
of gassed cases, methods employed for transporting the wounded, and selection and
operation of lines of evacuation, treatment of water for drinking purposes, and kindred
subjects. This course was followed by visits to the front, both by medical officers and
enlisted men. British and American officers and men worked in perfect harmony to secure
the best possible results from the training and to complete it at as early a date as
possible. At this time, the duties of the corps surgeon consisted mainly of frequent
visits to divisional areas, general supervision of sanitary conditions, conferences with
the division medical officers, and oversight of the records and reports required.5
Upon arrival of an American division in the British
area, all our Medical Department material and equipment, except the personal equipment of
officers and men, was turned in for storage, and British equipment and medical supplies
were issued in its stead. These supplies were obtained from the nearest British field
medical supply depot, on requisition approved by the division surgeon.5
All Medical Department transportation was also furnished
by the British. In some instances, this transportation, especially the motor ambulances,
was found to be old, worn, and unserviceable, as most of it had been in constant use for a
long time. During the training period, however, it answered the purpose.5
Some complaint was made by the personnel of American
divisions, soon after their arrival, concerning rations furnished by the British. In point
of fact, complaints were due probably to the change from living in well-constructed
cantonments in the United States, where there were excellent cooking arrangements and a
generous ration, to field conditions and a ration figured down to the lowest point to meet
actual requirements. After becoming adjusted to the new conditions and having coffee
substituted for tea (which was at first furnished by the British) no further complaints
were received, and the men showed by their appearance that the ration supply was ample and
suitable.5
THE 27TH DIVISION
During June, 1918, the 27th Division (less Artillery and
most of its train), was attached for training to British troops in Belgium. On July 9,
after having been attached to the British Nineteenth Corps,
the division was assigned to the defense of the east Poperinghe line, the second line of
defense in the Dickebush and Scherpenberg sectors, on a front of approximately 3.6 km.
(2.2 miles). At that time, enemy forces operating in Flanders comprised a group of armies
which it was known were to attack to the north part of the Lys salient, in the vicinity of
Mount Kemmel, for the purpose of driving through to the sea, gaining the channel ports,
and cutting the allied army in two.6
The position of the division was under direct
observation from Mount Kemmel, and casualties were caused almost daily by enemy shell
fire. While holding the line, troops of the division continued the training required by
General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. The division was assigned to the
American Second Corps, but at this time the only control exercised by the Second Corps was
in training and instruction.6
On August 23 the division relieved the British 6th
Division in the front line of the Dickebush sector, on a front of 3.1 km. (1.9 miles) at
Dickebush Lake. From here, on August 31, the division attacked in the Ypres-Lys operation,
and on that date and the following two days advanced its line about 1.8 km. (1.1 miles).6
On the night of September 2-3 the division turned over
its new line to the British 41st Division, and on the 3d it moved to the Winnezeele area.
It was transferred from the British Second Army to the British Third Army; and on
September 4-5 entrained for an area near Doullens. On September 4 division headquarters
was established at Beauquesne, and the division was billeted for training in the
surrounding area, being transferred from the British Third Army to British General
Headquarters reserve. Here the division remained until September 22.7
On September 23-24 the division moved by rail and by
road from the Beauquesne training area to the vicinity of Tincourt, having been
transferred from the British General Headquarters reserve to the British Fourth Army. On
the night of September 24-25 it relieved the British 18th and 74th Divisions in the front
line. The line taken over ran generally north and south on the east of Ronssoy, and
extended from the vicinity of Le Tombois farm to Malakoff farm. The support line was
approximately a north and south line through the eastern outskirts of Ronssoy.7
The line taken over faced, at about 910 meters (1,000
yards), the outer defenses of the main Hindenburg system, to the west of Bellicourt
tunnel, the division holding a 4-km. (2.5-mile) front.7
The enemy held several strong points and outposts close
to our line and had repulsed previous attempts to take them. The main features of this
outer line were its strong positions situated on the high ground opposite the
division’s right sector and left, called, respectively, Quennemont farm, Guillemont
farm, and the Knoll. From this outer line the terrain sloped down toward the main
Hindenburg line, about 1.3 km. (1,500 yards) to the east, rising again at Bony, which was
included in the enemy defensive system.7
An attack on the main Hindenburg line being
contemplated, it was decided by the commander of the British Fourth Army that a
preliminary operation was necessary in order to occupy the outer line of defenses,
including the Knoll, and Guillemont and Quennemont farms, from which to launch the main
attack. The line taken over by the 30th Division on the right was farther advanced than
was that of the 27th, and included much of the outer lines of defenses. The line held by
the British 12th Division on the left dropped back in a northwesterly direction, giving
the 27th little support, and leaving Vendhuile (strongly occupied) free to threaten the
left of any advance made by the 27th.7
On September 27 the division, 53d Brigade in line,
attacked in the preliminary operation, its objective being the rearmost trenches of the
outer line of the Hindenburg system, at a distance of about 1 km. (1,100 yards) from the
line occupied by our troops. Throughout the day there were attacks and counterattacks, and
on the night of September 27-28, when the 54th Brigade relieved the 53d Brigade, in the
front line, the position taken over was practically the old front line held previous to
September 27.7
On September 28 preparations were made for the main
attack to take place on the following day. On the 29th, the 54th Brigade advanced. On the
extreme left, opposition was met with from the start, the enemy holding outposts quite
close to our line. The right regiment advanced during the day, an average depth of about 2
km. (1.2 miles). On the left, the troops advanced to a position on a line just east of the
Knoll. The division line, on the evening of September 29, was approximately as follows:
From the Knoll south to the west of Guillemont farm, thence southeastwardly to the
Hindenburg line, and along this line to the division limits.7
On September 30 the troops of the division in the rear
line remained in support during the day in the same position as that occupied on the
evening of September 29. Under an arrangement with the Australian 3d Division, which had
taken over the front line on the night of September 29-30, those portions of the 27th
Division which were on the front lines moved forward with the Australian division and
continued the attack during the 30th, completing the capture of the Hindenburg line in the
right regimental sector, capturing the Hindenburg line in the left regimental sector, and
capturing Bony, the possession of which place was not completely gained until the
following day.7
Upon its relief from the lines, the 27th Division moved
to the Peronne area. On the right of October 11-12 the 54th Infantry Brigade relieved
units of the 30th Division in the front line. The 53d Infantry Brigade moved up, in
support, to camps west and northwest of Busigny. The line taken over from the 30th
Division was about 7,800 meters (8,500 yards) long, on the west bank of the Selle,
extending from the village of St. Benin on the north to the south of St. Souplet, thence
extending westward somewhat to and around the eastern outskirts of Vaux-Andigny. On the
night of October 14-15 the division front was reduced to about 7.7 km. (4.7 miles), the
British 6th Division taking over a portion of the line on the south, and the British 50th Division a portion of the line on the north. Preparatory
to an offensive operation to commence on October 17 this line was still further reduced on
the night of October 15-16, the 30th Division taking over that portion which extended
southwardly from just north of St. Martin-Riviere. The 53d Infantry Brigade relieved the
54th Infantry Brigade on the southern part of the division sector. This placed the
Infantry brigades of the division on the front side by side, each holding a frontage of
about 1,820 meters (2,000 yards). The enemy was holding a line on the east bank of the
Selle River as far south as St. Souplet.6, 7, 8
On October 17 the division, as a part of the American
Second Corps, and in connection with the general British advance, attacked in the
direction of Catillon. There was a very heavy fog in the morning of the attack, and this,
combined with the smoke from the barrage, rendered it impossible to see except for very
short distances. The advance was difficult from the start, both on account of the
difficulty of observation and the terrain, which had to be covered immediately troops
moved forward. The village of Arbre de Guise (Guernon), Advantage farm, the line of the
main highway, Joncq de Mer ridge, Baudival farm, and many points along the ridges and
railway embankments were found to be strongly held by the enemy with machine-gun nests and
infantry. At nightfall, the left of the line was approximately along the ridge 227 meters
(250 yards) west of Le Cateau—Wassigny road. In the right brigade sector the line was
continued forward which reached the road north of Advantage farm, and passed along to and
around the eastern outskirts of Arbre de Guise to the boundary of the divisional sector,
where it connected up with the 30th Division.7, 8
On October 18 the troops advanced at 5.30 a. m. In the
right brigade sector the troops met with enemy machine-gun fire from many hedges along the
ridge about 455 meters (500 yards) east of the departure line, and enfilade fire from the
sector of the division on the right. This delayed the attack on the right, but in the
afternoon the line was advanced to the ridge east of Arbre de Guise. In the left brigade
sector no serious resistance was encountered until the line Joncq de Mer farm—La Roue
farm was reached.7
During the night October 18-19 the line moved forward
across the Joncq de Mer valley and seized the river west of the St. Maurice valley with
very little resistance except from La Jonquiere farm, and because of it, the troops
entrenched on the eastern crest of the Jonquiere farm ridge, where it remained in position
during October 20. On the latter date arrangements were made for the relief of the
division, and on the night of October 20-21 the British 6th Division marched in and
relieved the 27th, after which the 27th Division moved to the vicinity of St. Souplet and
Busigny. During October 21, 22, 23 the division marched back to the Roisel and Tincourt
areas, where, on October 23-24, the troops entrained for the Corbie area.7
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
While the division was encamped in the Somme area, it
turned in all medical property not carried by the personnel individually, and gradually
received corresponding British equipment in its stead.
This included water carts, with sterilizing apparatus, in whose use attendants were
instructed by the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance of the British 66th Division. In the
British service the field ambulance comprised a field hospital and an ambulance company
combined. The divisional medical service was soon reinforced by another British unit, viz,
2/1 East Lancashire Field Ambulance, and for instruction American medical officers were
assigned to both these organizations. For the same purpose, British officers gave lectures
daily to all medical officers of the 27th Division, and a few of the latter were assigned
to field ambulances serving the battle line.9 During the time from July 9 to July 31 the 2/2 East Lancashire Field
Ambulance established a main dressing station (equivalent to our field hospital) at
Trappistes Ferme and a smaller collection station at Oudezeele, and collected all the sick
and wounded from this area, transporting the mild cases to the division rest station
operated by the 2/1 East Lancashire Field Ambulance at Arneke and more serious ones to
casualty clearing station, Canadian No. 2, and ambulance clearing station, Australian No.
1, at Esquelbeck. These organizations were British analogues of our evacuation hospitals.10 The division was under shell fire here, and a
number of battle casualties occurred. On July 31 Field Hospitals No. 105 and No. 106 and
Ambulance Company No. 106 of the 102d Sanitary Train joined the division, the first of the
divisional medical units to rejoin in France. Field Hospital No. 105 was stationed at
Oudezeele, Field Hospital No. 106 at Arneke, and Ambulance Company No. 106 at Trappistes
Ferme.10
On August 20, in anticipation of occupation of a sector
of the battle line by the 27th Division, the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance and Field
Hospital No. 105 were ordered to take over the main dressing station at Remy siding, then
operated by the 17th Field Ambulance, of the 6th British Division, while the 2/1 Field
Ambulance, in the forward area, took over advance dressing stations at Long Barn (right
flank) and at St. Dunstan (left flank). This relief was to be completed August 23-24.11 The personnel of the latter unit was
supplemented by Ambulance Companies No. 106 and No. 107, which had reported to the
division August 22, and by the bearer section of 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance. A
collecting station for slightly wounded was organized at Burre barn, whence casualties
were evacuated on a 1-meter railway to the main dressing station at Remy siding. At
Trappistes Ferme, Field Hospital No. 106 operated a sick collecting post during the
interval August 24 to September 3, receiving sick from all units not in the front line. It
held the minor cases, but sent others to the casualty clearing stations at Esquelbeck.11
The advance dressing station at Long Barn occupied
shell-proof elephant shelters, reinforced with sandbags. This station received patients by
hand or wheel stretcher carry from nine regimental and battalion aid posts and evacuated
by motor ambulance to the main dressing station at Remy siding—a distance of 7 km.
(4.3 miles). The total number treated at this post was 335 Americans and 89 British.11
The advance dressing station at St. Dunstan occupied two
reinforced elephant shelters and one dugout, all constructed in old buildings. The 221 patients received at this station from two battalion aid
posts were evacuated over a 12-km. (7.1-mile) route to the main dressing station at Remy
siding.12
On August 27 the entire medical, surgical, and ordnance
equipment of the 2/1 and the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulances were ordered by
the Second British Army transferred to the 102d Sanitary Train, and the British
organizations were relieved from the 27th Division.12
The transport so taken over by 102d Sanitary Train
consisted of 4 Ford, 9 Daimler, and 6 horse-drawn ambulances; their condition was such
that under constant use they were unable to stand the strain. By September 2 the
ambulances frequently had to be sent to the shop for repairs, and at times only 7 or 8 of
them were in commission. From August 24 to September 30 the sanitary train was reinforced
by three ambulances from a neighboring British unit. During this period two ambulances
were damaged by shell fire.12
After the relief of the 2/1 and 2/2 East Lancashire
Field Ambulances the ambulance company personnel of the forward area consisted of 9
officers and 168 men of Ambulance Companies No. 106 and No. 107.12
The British 133d Field Ambulance, which reported for
duty with the division on August 20, 1918, operated the divisional rest station at Arneke
until, on September 1, it was relieved from this duty, then taking over the divisional
rest station at Hilhoek from the British 16th Field Ambulance of the 6th Division.13
On August 31, on the advance of the 27th Division to
York road, and on subsequent advances of September 1 and 2, the advanced dressing stations
were held in their original positions at Long Barn and St. Dunstan, while advanced car
posts were pushed up the Ouderdom-Vierstraat and Hallebast-Vijverhoek road. A car post was
established behind a brick house in the outskirts of St. Hubert-Ushoek, some 364 meters
(400 yards) from Hallebast Corners and about 1.8 km. (1.1 miles) from the advance dressing
station. Ambulances were stationed here until a sufficient number of cases to warrant
their removal were assembled at a collecting post established 1.2 km. (0.74 mile) forward,
when a motor ambulance was speeded over the dangerous area to the collecting post. The
American Red Cross was constantly in touch with the forward area, its division
representative establishing a depot of supplies at the main dressing station at Remy
siding and issuing to each battalion aid post a primus stove, cocoa, sugar, milk,
cigarettes, tobacco, and extra blankets.13
On September 2 and 3 the sanitary train was relieved,
and with the British Field Ambulance No. 133 marched to Proven, where all the
organizations entrained for the Doullens area, arriving September 4. The 102d Sanitary
Train, which now comprised Field Hospitals No. 105 and No. 106, and Ambulance Companies
No. 106 and No. 107, was now billeted at Beauval, where the field hospitals established a
division rest station for the sick returnable to duty within 14 days, sending the more
serious cases to Casualty Clearing Station No. 21, several kilometers distant.14
While the division remained in this area, from September
4 to 22, its sanitary personnel participated further in intensive training. A problem covering and simulating the proposed attack on the
Hindenburg line was carried out, in which the entire division participated.14
On September 25 Field Hospital No. 105 relieved the
field ambulance company of the British 74th Division, which had been conducting a main
dressing station at Driencourt, and Field Hospital No. 106 established itself at
Longavesnes, where it converted two wooden buildings into dressing rooms and erected
marquee tents as wards.14 The next
day, Field Hospital No. 105 closed and moved to Villers-Faucon, where it began to receive
patients at noon on the 27th. The advance dressing station was established by Ambulance
Company No. 106, on the night of September 24, in some old buildings and dugouts at St.
Emilie, the forward area being covered by Ambulance Companies No. 106 and No. 107,
reinforced by the litter-bearer section of the 133d British Field Ambulance and 100 men of
the 108th Infantry. The motor transport consisted of 3 Ford and 11 Daimler ambulances.14 The personnel of the advance dressing station was
taxed to the limit of its endurance, and on the morning of the 28th was reinforced by the
Australian 11th Field Ambulance.15 From
this location walking wounded were carried by trucks to the corps walking wounded rail
post just east of Villers-Faucon. During the main attack commenced on the 29th the motor
transportation was reinforced by 10 Red Cross ambulances and an advanced car post was
established at Ronsoy, whence cars were sent up to the front on the
Ronsoy—Lempire—Bellicourt roads. Motor ambulances evacuated the main dressing
station to the casualty clearing station at Tincourt and Doigt.15 On October 2, when the division was relieved, the sanitary train and Field
Ambulance No. 133 marched to Courcelles, where they rested until October 8.16
October 10, an advance party of Field Hospital No. 106
proceeded to Montbrehain to take over the main dressing station at this point from the
American 30th Division. The next day when orders were received for the 27th Division to
take over the line from the American 30th Division, Field Hospital No. 105 prepared the
schoolhouse at Premont for use as a main dressing station, and Field Hospital No. 106
opened an advance dressing station at Busigny. These arrangements continued until the
morning of the 18th of October, when the advance through St. Souplet occurred.16 Use of a field hospital to operate the advance
dressing station was due to the experience, on September 27, at St. Emilie, where it had
been learned that two ambulance companies were unable to spare sufficient personnel to
operate such a formation during a period when a great many casualties were arriving.
Employment of a field hospital as an advance dressing station was also advantageous
because this could be used later as a main dressing station if the main dressing station
from the rear was "leapfrogged" beyond it.17
Ambulance Companies No. 106 and No. 107, the
litter-bearer section of the British 133d Field Ambulance, with the motor and horse
ambulances, evacuated the forward area. Transportation was again augmented by a loan of 10
American Red Cross ambulances.17
At the beginning of the battle of La Selle River, on
October 17, the main dressing station at Premont was closed, the advanced dressing station
was converted into a main dressing station, and the British
133d Field Ambulance opened an advance dressing station at Escaufourt, with the main car
post at St. Souplet. This was later pushed across the river and railroad tracks to
L’Arbre de Guise, and up to North Chimney and La Roue Ferme. On October 19 Field
Hospital No. 105 opened an advance dressing station at St. Souplet, the British 133d Field
Ambulance closing at Escaufourt.17
Evacuation of the forward area was effected promptly and
completely each day by nightfall, as the nature of the terrain made it possible to push
Ford ambulances up close to the rear of the advancing troops. Evacuation from the main
dressing station to the casualty clearing station was very difficult, because of the long
distance and the condition of the roads. The round trip, owing to the rapid advance of
troops and the delay in advancing railhead and casualty clearing station, took from eight
to nine hours. At first the convoy consisted of 40 ambulances from the British 37th Motor
Ambulance Convoy, but upon the return of the American 30th Division, which took over half
of the front line of the 27th Division on October 15-16, 20 ambulances were transferred to
that organization. The ambulances remaining with the 27th Division proving inadequate, 22
were turned over to it by the corps and army. This reinforcement was adequate promptly to
evacuate all the division’s casualties.17
The walking wounded were transported to the entraining
point at Montbrehain, where a detail from Field Hospital No. 105 operated an entraining
post. The division dental surgeon, with a detail from Field Hospital No. 105, operated a
detraining point at Roisel whence the wounded were conducted across a badly torn-up field
to waiting char à bancs for evacuation to the casualty clearing station at Roisel,
1.5 km. (0.9 mile) distant.18
After the 27th Division was relieved by the British 6th
Division and ordered to Corbie, Field Hospitals No. 106 and No. 107, which had reported
for duty October 25, opened a division rest station at Fouilloy on October 26, and Field
Hospital No. 105 opened a disinfesting and treatment station for scabies at Corbie. Field
Hospital No. 108 had reported for duty with the division on October 15, but was held at
Roisel until ordered to Corbie, October 24. Ambulance Companies No. 105 and No. 108
reported October 20, but were likewise held at Roisel until ordered to Corbie.18
THE 30TH DIVISION
On July 2, 3, and 4, 1918, the 30th Division moved to
Belgium, under the British Second Army. For further training, units were brigaded with
British divisions in the canal sector southwest of Ypres, from July 16 to August 17. On
August 17-18 the division took over the canal sector from the British, holding its
position until August 30. During the period August 31 to September 2 the division
participated in the Ypres-Lys operation in the battle before Mount Kemmel. In this
operation the division captured all its objectives, including Lock No. 8, Lankhof farm,
and the city of Voornezeele, advancing 1,500 yards.19, 20
On September 4-5 the division was withdrawn from the
canal sector and was placed in British General Headquarters reserve, with division
headquarters at Roellecourt, France. While in this area, the entire division was trained
in attacking in conjunction with British tanks.19
On September 17 the division was again moved farther
south, with division headquarters at Herissant; and on September 22 was moved to the
British Fourth Army, with division headquarters at Bois de Buire, near Tincourt, taking
over a front line sector from the Australian 1st Division on the night of September 23-24.19
On September 29 the division, with the American 27th
Division on the left and the British 46th Division on the right, assaulted the Hindenburg
line, which at this time curved in front of the subterranean canal south of Bellicourt.
The Infantry started off well from the line of departure, but had not progressed more than
a few hundred yards before they began to experience difficulty in maintaining direction
and contact. During the remainder of the morning the attack was carried on by more or less
mixed groups which had been picked up along the whole front. Small groups of men, acting
on their own initiative, would clear out troublesome machine-gun nests, or complete the capture of any trench encountered. The troops on the
right, having the enemy only in their direct front to contend with, were able to make
steady progress toward their objective. Troops on the left early encountered machine-gun
fire from the sector on their left and were soon forced to form a defensive flank in that
direction. On the afternoon of the 29th, at the time the Australian 5th Division passed
through the 30th Division, the 117th Infantry, on the right, was approximately on their
objective, facing southeast and in touch with the 46th Division, on their right; the 120th
Infantry was in Nauroy, elements having gone beyond there and reached their objective, but
having been forced to return on account of being out of touch with units on their flanks;
the regiment in general occupied Le Catelet—Nauroy line. The 119th Infantry had its
right on the Le Catelet—Nauroy line, but had been forced to bend its line back to the
tunnel because of fire from the sector on its left. When the Australian 5th Division
passed through the line held by the 30th Division, they were joined and assisted by
various groups from the different regiments of the 30th Division. These groups remained
with the Australian division and were withdrawn during the night September 29-30.20
On October 2, the division was moved back to the
Herbecourt and Le Mesnil areas, presumably for rest and refitting. However, on October 5
it moved to the vicinity of Hargicourt and Templeux le Guerard, and on the night of
October 5-6 its 59th Infantry Brigade relieved the Australian 5th Division in the line
extending from Montbrehain northwest to near Beaurevoir.20
A formal attack having been ordered by the American
Second Corps for October 8, the division advanced on a front of approximately 3.6 km. (2.2
miles), with two objectives, the first about 3.6 km. (2.27 miles) distant, including the
town of Brancourt; and the second, about 2.2 km. (1.3 miles) beyond the first objective,
including the town of Premont. By the end of the day both these towns had been captured
and the line lay east of Premont.20
On October 9 the 59th Brigade attacked, its objective
being about 4.5 km. (2.7 miles) distant. Having attained this, it was passed through
during the afternoon by the 60th Brigade, whose objective was 1.8 km. (1.1 miles) beyond.
This was attained on the afternoon of the same day.20
On October 10 the attack was renewed, the objective now
being the high ground to the east of the Selle River, from St. Benin to Molain, both
villages inclusive. This necessitated an advance of from 5 to 6 km. (3.1 to 3.7 miles)
over very difficult terrain, including villages, farms, and woods.20 The 119th Infantry, by 12.50 p. m., had captured
St. Souplet and St. Benin, the latter in conjunction with the British.
The 120th Infantry took Vaux Andigny, but the British
Ninth Corps, on its right, got only as far as the west edge of the Bois de Riquerval. The
120th, being then exposed to fire from the south and southeast, was compelled to refuse
its right along the railway south of Vaux, and was unable to reach its objective, the
village of Molain and the Seille River.5
On October 11 the left of the line remained stationary,
but on the right the town of la Haie Menneresse was taken, and the line in general was
advanced about 910 meters (1,000 yards).20
On the night of October 11-12 the 30th Division was
relieved by the 27th Division, and remained in support of that division until October 16.20
On the night of October 15-16, the 59th Brigade took
over a portion of the line held by the 27th Division,5 the front being practically the same as that which had been turned over on
the night of October 11-12. The front assigned to the 30th Division was only about 1.8 km.
(1.1 miles) in extent, but included the towns of St. Martin-Riviere and Molain, both of
which were strongly held; while the high ground on the east bank of the river was
fortified by trenches and wire.20
On October 17 the 59th Brigade attacked, its objective
being a line at about 5.4 km. (3.3 miles) in front. The Infantry and tanks moved off
promptly at the prescribed time. Strong resistance was encountered, particularly from the
towns above mentioned; this, together with some difficulty experienced in crossing the
Selle River, made it impossible to keep up with the barrage. After losing the barrage,
heavy enemy machine-gun and artillery fire rendered progress impossible without ruinous
losses. The brigade therefore entrenched on a line at about 3.6 km. (2.2 miles) from the
parallel of departure, and was here relieved by the 60th Brigade on the night of October
17-18.20
On October 18 the 60th Brigade attacked, its objective
being the high ground commanding the Sambre canal. The terrain included in the attack
presented many difficulties to an advance. The towns of Ribeauville, Ecaillon,
Ribeaucourt, and Mazinghien furnished a series of natural centers of resistance, with
mutual covering fire, while many hedges and woods were filled with machine-gun nests. Very
stubborn resistance was encountered, especially from the above-mentioned towns; though the
line was advanced some 1.8 km. (1.1 miles) on the right, it was bent back on the left
above the town of Mazinghien, which offered exceptionally good opportunities for defense.
This line held during the night October l8-19.20
On October 19 the attack was again made, the objective
being again the high ground overlooking the Sambre canal. Again the attack met with severe
resistance, especially from la Haie Tonnoile Ferme. All resistance, however, was finally
overcome and the troops were practically on their objective when a halt was ordered to
straighten out the division line preparatory to being relieved by the British 1st
Division.
On the night of October 19-20 the relief was made, and
the division moved back by easy stages to the Tincourt and Roisel areas.
On October 24 it entrained for the Guerrien training
area, northeast of Amiens, where it remained until November 21.19,
20
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On July 5 three field ambulances, Nos. 132, 133, 134, of
the British 39th Division were attached to the 30th Division to care for its sick and
wounded. Field Ambulance No. 133 was detached on August 16, 1918. The sanitary train of
the division did not join until August 1, 1918, when Field Hospitals No. 118 and No. 119
and Ambulance Companies No. 118 and No. 119 reported.
In order to comply with the British Tables of
Organization, the field hospitals and ambulance companies were combined on August 14 and
designated Field Ambulances No. 118 and No. 119.21, b
On September 28 the following medical arrangements were
made: Two aid posts were established in both the right and left sectors of the division,
and back of these, in each sector, one ambulance loading post (collecting station).
Advance dressing stations were established by the American Field Ambulance No. 119 at
Jeancourt in the right sector and at Templeux le Guerard in the left. A station for
walking wounded was also located at the latter point. The main dressing station was
established by American Field Ambulance No. 118 and the divisional gas center by British
Field Ambulance No. 132 at Marquaix. The ambulance dispatch post was located at Roisel.
British Field Ambulance No. 134, in reserve, was to operate a temporary advance dressing
station in the right sector. The bearer subdivisions of the American Field Ambulance No.
118 and the British Field Ambulance No. 132 were ordered to be relieved on call by the
commanding officer of the American Field Ambulance No. 119, as were all ambulances and
wheeled litters.21
Within one and a half hours after the barrage was let
down at 5.30 a. m. the wounded began to come in rapidly, and soon the advance stations
were working to full capacity. Large numbers of German prisoners were employed to bring in
litter cases from the front lines. The walking wounded, after being dressed and receiving
antitetanic serum, were sent by auto bus or truck to an entraining point on a light
railway which carried them to within 1.6 km. (1 mile) of Tincourt, where a casualty
clearing station was located. Congestion developed at the dressing stations, particularly
at Jeancourt, but was overcome by obtaining additional ambulances. The casualty clearing
stations nearest the field ambulances were soon filled to capacity, necessitating
evacuation to others farther to the rear. Cases of abdominal and chest wounds were
selected for immediate evacuation to the casualty clearing station. The average time
necessary for the removal of these and other seriously wounded patients from the time
their wounds were received until they reached the casualty clearing station, was
approximately four and a half hours. In the 24 hours from 6 a. m. September 29 to 6 a. m.
September 30, a total of 2,075 cases were evacuated, and the following day 1,265. Each
medical formation replenished its supplies by informal requisition on the organization in
its rear.21
On October 8 the advance dressing station was moved
forward to Montbrehain and the American Field Ambulance No. 119 opened a main dressing
station and degassing center at Joncourt, where American Field Ambulance No. 118 went into
reserve.22 On October 9 the
ambulance section of this company opened an advance dressing station at Busigny. The
station for walking wounded was advanced to Bellicourt, where patients were entrained.
Later the walking wounded were entrained at Joncourt. The American Field Ambulance No. 119
moved up to Montbrehain; the 132d (British) went into
reserve. The walking-wounded station, conducted by the
British Field Ambulance No. 134 was now advanced to Busigny.21 On October 10 a hospital for divisional sick was established at the main
dressing station at Montbrehain and continued to receive patients after the division
withdrew from the line on the night of October 11-12.21
When the division again reentered the line on the night
of October 15-16, in the right of the Second Corps, the American Field Ambulance No. 118
established the advance dressing station at Busigny, where the British Field Ambulance No.
134 opened the post for walking wounded, evacuating by light railroad to the casualty
clearing station at Templeux le Guerard. The main dressing station and gas center were
established by the American Field Ambulance No. 119 at Montbrehain, and the British Field
Ambulance No. 132 was in reserve.21
On October 17 the last-mentioned unit soon opened the main dressing station and gas center
at Bohain, while that operated by the American Field Ambulance No. 119 cleared at
Montbrehain and went into reserve at that place.21 On the 18th the American Field Ambulance No. 118 opened an advance dressing
station at Molaine, and at the same time the station for walking wounded was brought
forward from Busigny. The distance from the main dressing station at Bohain to the
casualty clearing station at Templeux le Guerard was now so long that some difficulty
occurred in clearing the former on the night of October 17-18.21 The following night the division was relieved and the sanitary train accompanied
it to the Querrieu area, near Amiens. British Field Ambulances No. 132 and No. 134 were
relieved from duty with the division on November 17.21
REFERENCES
(1) Report of assistant chief of staff, G-3, G. H. Q.,
July 2, 1919.
(2) G. O. No. 1, Second Corps, 1918.
(3) Journal of operations, Second Corps. Report of
Medical Department activities, Second Corps, by Col. C. C. Collins, M. C., corps surgeon,
undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Report of operations, Second Corps, December 18,
1918.
(5) Report of Medical Department activities, Second
Corps, A. E. F., by Col. C. C. Collins, M. C., corps surgeon, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(6) Operations report, 27th Division, undated.
(7) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army,
1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical
Section, the Army War College. 1700, (27th Division).
(8) Front line map, American battle monuments
commission.
(9) Report of Medical Department activities, 27th
Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 2, 3.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(10) Ibid., 5.
(11) Ibid., 7.
(12) Ibid., 8.
(13) Ibid., 9.
(14) Ibid., 10.
(15) Ibid., 11.
(16) Ibid., 12.
(17) Ibid., 13.
(18) Ibid., 14.
(19) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared
in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College, 1700 (30th Division).
(20) Operations reports, 30th Division, undated.
(21) War diaries, division surgeon’s office, 30th Division. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
SOURCE: THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR
VOLUME VIII FIELD OPERATIONS
PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
MAJ. GEN. M. W. IRELAND
The Surgeon General
by
COL. CHARLES LYNCH, M. C.
COL. JOSEPH H. FORD, M. C.
LIEUT. COL. FRANK W. WEED, M. C.
WASHINGTON :: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE :: 1925
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BORROWED SOLDIERS
Americans under British Command, 1918 by Mitchell Yockelson
